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ABSTRACT  
Ongoing American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq raises fun-
damental questions about this great power’s historical experiences
with nation-building, specifically its ability to learn from the past. It
is certainly true that the United States has been an active nation-
builder, aiming not only to put states back together but ultimately to
transform and recreate societies. In 1995, it took the lead in ending
the violence that engulfed Bosnia-Herzegovina. American efforts in
this Balkan country provide an excellent case study to evaluate its
ability to learn and improve upon its policies. Looking briefly at the
literature on learning and then at Bosnia’s reconstruction, this arti-
cle argues that the Bush administration’s ideological beliefs, specif-
ically what some have called “doctrinal unilateralism,” have led this
administration to ignore important lessons wrought from the
Balkans.
INTRODUCTION 
In the latter part of 1995, the United States took the lead in ending the hor-
rific violence that engulfed Bosnia-Herzegovina for more than three years. Again
in 1999, it led members of the international community in calming ethnic ten-
sions in Kosovo. Together, these two efforts meant that by the century’s end, an
American presence was clearly visible throughout the Balkans. Since taking
office, President George W. Bush has not only maintained American commit-
ment to this region, but he has made the once-derided concept of “nation-build-
ing” and the problem of failed states central concerns of US foreign policy.2
American-led efforts have indeed accomplished a great deal in the Balkans.3
However, this article argues that the Bush administration’s ideological beliefs,
specifically what some have called “doctrinal unilateralism” have meant that the
US has wholly ignored or failed to learn important lessons from the Balkans.4 As
a former US Army retired general put it, “the U.S. mission in Iraq has been made
more difficult by this administration’s aversion to nation-building and its deter-
mination not to study the lessons” of the past.5
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International relations scholars who focus on the concept of learning would
not be surprised by this failure to learn or by the inability of the administration
to improve its policies based on historical experiences. In fact, much of the schol-
arly research on the topic of learning concludes that policymakers often do not
learn; instead, they use history selectively, drawing inappropriate parallels to the
past and intentionally misreading the lessons of history to justify their positions.6
After reviewing in Part I some of the extensive literature on foreign policy learn-
ing, the article argues that the basic learning model — which posits a causal rela-
tionship between past events and current beliefs and policies — is not helpful in
understanding current US policies toward failed states. What is more useful is an
understanding of the ideology that has underpinned American foreign policy
under President Bush.  I, thus, contend that instead of learning from the Balkans
and experiences on the ground — both good and bad — faith in American mili-
tary strength, unilateralist policies, and universalism have prevailed.7
Part II turns to the Balkans, summarizing unique characteristics of the
region and peace-building efforts there to account for the relative success of this
nation-building exercise. Part III explains the impact of Bush’s doctrinal unilat-
eralist thinking on assumptions and policies toward failed states. In particular, I
discuss four myths that were evident in the discourse and behavior of the US as
it geared up for interventions in other countries. With evidence from American-
led efforts in the Balkans, I explain why these myths are not only wrong but have
proven dangerous guides for ongoing peace-building activities in places like
Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper concludes with additional lessons based on the
peaceful but still fragile environments in Bosnia and Kosovo today. 
Foreign Policy Learning
Since the early works of Ernest May and Robert Jervis in the 1970s, the
concept of ‘learning’ has waxed and waned in international relations research.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to distill some of the insights on how and when
decision-makers are most likely to learn. This literature is vast, and my goal is
neither to summarize this extensive and interdisciplinary pursuit, nor to explain
the many conceptual and empirical problems associated with defining, isolating,
and measuring foreign policy learning.8 Instead, my aim is to draw on some of
these theoretical insights to make the case that although many parts of the US
government had developed long lists of “the lessons” of Bosnia and Kosovo,
President Bush and his senior advisors intentionally ignored these lessons or
derived just the opposite points to support their ideological inclinations and pol-
icy goals.9 Consequently, ideology and a distinct disdain for nation-building
fashioned and distorted the country’s assumptions about failed states, producing
worse, rather than better, policies in Afghanistan and Iraq.10
Scholars have developed a variety of different definitions of learning.11 I
think of learning in terms of individuals, and a change in beliefs, or the develop-
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ment of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and inter-
pretation of experiences.12 Learning does not necessarily mean policy changes,
nor does it mean that leaders must acknowledge the empirically correct or nor-
matively desirable lessons of history. However, especially when one thinks of
learning in security policy, it is most useful to consider when specific individu-
als within governments (like presidents in the US) are most likely to change their
beliefs or develop new ones. There is, in fact, some consensus on this, and it
points to failure, rather than success, in encouraging individuals to learn, as do
first-hand experiences, or the occurrence of a major event in the formative peri-
od of a decision-maker’s life. 
Robert Jervis contends that even when these conditions are present, learn-
ing is often thwarted because people tend to pay more attention to what has hap-
pened rather than to why it has happened. This process yields broad generaliza-
tions about events that usually fail to strip away from the past events those facets
that depend on the ephemeral context.13 Politicians, in fact, often seize upon his-
torical analogies to bolster their pre-existing beliefs and preferences rather than
allowing the past to shape their beliefs and policies.14 In theorizing about foreign
policy learning, Philip Tetlock hypothesizes that since governments are organ-
ized hierarchically, with fundamental assumptions and policy objectives at the
highest level, policy beliefs and preferences at an intermediate level and tactical
beliefs at the bottom, most learning happens at the tactical level. Policy decision-
makers at the top can learn and will reconsider their basic strategic assumptions
and objectives — but only after repeated strategic failures. Tetlock maintains that
“fundamental learning is so psychologically difficult that it is likely to occur only
in conjunction with massive personnel shift.”15 Taken together, these few propo-
sitions suggest that foreign policy learning is neither guaranteed, nor based sole-
ly on historical events. What these propositions do not say explicitly, but should,
is that learning is always mediated by ideology and politics.
Scholars have noted that, as a presidential candidate, George W. Bush took
a clear stand on nation-building and what he saw as Clinton’s humanitarian
‘escapades’ in the Balkans.16 During the second presidential debate with Vice-
President Gore, Governor Bush even stated that there would be no kind of
nation-building corps coming from America because the US military was meant
to fight and win wars not build nations.17 By 2002, the administration started to
adopt a different attitude, mentioning General George C. Marshall and US poli-
cy toward Europe after the Second World War. In one speech, Bush reassured
Afghans that the US was committed to their country’s reconstruction; “We’re
tough, we’re determined  . . . we will stay until the mission is done.”18 Later the
President would adopt a similar take on Iraq, asserting that the rebuilding of this
country would constitute a central part of American history and that it would
remain in Iraq as long as necessary. 
It would be easy to chalk up this policy reversal to learning or to the post-
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11 September world, “where poverty and hopelessness” spawned terror and ter-
ror threatened both US and world security, requiring the United States to engage
in nation-building.19 This sudden change in attitude was, however, more appar-
ent than real; it did not result in foreign policy learning about nation-building;
and the semblance of change was not due solely to the terrorist attacks on the
United States. Instead, I submit that the President’s decision to put nation-build-
ing back on the agenda — though consciously avoiding these words — is root-
ed in his long-standing assumptions about international politics and the position
of the US in the world. Given President Bush’s lack of first-hand experiences
with failed states as well as the other conditions deemed critical for learning, it
is more plausible that his preexisting beliefs and enduring foreign policy objec-
tives had far more sway over his behavior toward other failed states and military
intervention. In fact, for the Bush administration, “the war (in Iraq) seemed like
a win-win situation. The U.S. could oust a dictator, usher in a new era in Iraq,
and shift the balance of power in the Middle East, all without committing itself
to a lengthy, costly, and arduous peacekeeping or nation building mission.”20
David Brian Robertson further hypothesizes that policy-makers are
more likely to use history selectively to achieve their policy goals in areas where
facts are contested, values are complex, and partisan differences are sharp.21 It
is, thus, reasonable to conclude that current American policy toward Afghanistan
but especially Iraq, at least at the highest levels, is more influenced by ideologi-
cal proclivities than by historical events. In fact, unlike the Clinton administra-
tion’s thinking as it contemplated war with Kosovo, the Bush administration
actively discouraged any comparisons or references to Bosnia.22 At one point,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even asserted that he wanted to be sure
that Iraq did not become another Bosnia, that reconstruction and political issues
were worked out in advance so that the US would be able to say that “the mis-
sion is over and the troops can leave.”23 At the same time, in government docu-
ments and papers related to US policy toward failed states, Bosnia and Kosovo
went from being a waste of American resources to examples of how the US had
effectively responded and helped construct stable states.24 Once in Iraq, US
leaders were groping for historical models but instead of reflecting on the merits
of the Balkans, both the achievements and the pitfalls, it looked elsewhere.
James Dobbins, an expert on military intervention and nation-building, conclud-
ed that the “administration was neglecting the lessons of Bosnia at its own peril,”
choosing to see Germany’s reconstruction as an appropriate comparison and
model for Iraq.25
The terrorist attacks on the US did not so much prompt a fundamental
transformation in the President’s view of nation-building than they provided
additional evidence and legitimacy for his administration’s foreign policy con-
victions and specifically the need for regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. As
Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay explain, the accusations that President
Bush lacked knowledge about world affairs is not entirely correct; in fact,
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although foreign policy was clearly not his main concern, the President had a
fairly coherent foreign policy philosophy that was evident long before the
September 2001 attacks on the United States.26 Like his predecessors, President
Bush emphasized security, prosperity, and freedom in his speeches on US foreign
policy.  What was distinctive and perhaps even revolutionary about his approach
was how he thought that the US should achieve these foreign policy goals. Given
the United States’ unique position and power, the Bush administration contend-
ed that it did not need to abide by the stipulations of international organizations
or multilateral agreements.27 In lockstep with his top advisors, Bush championed
“assertive nationalism,” emphasizing America’s special mission in the world and
his administration’s willingness to use military force to defend the country from
any threat.28
Articulated formally in September 2002, the Bush administration’s grand
strategy emphasized American unilateral power and the right to preemptive
attack. At the same time, the President pledged to use the country’s position of
dominance to “bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free
trade to every corner of the world.” 29 According to John Ruggie, the unique fold
of the administration’s approach was the “doctrinal belief that the use of
American power abroad is entirely self-legitimating, requiring no recourse to the
view or interest of others and permitting no external constraints on its self-
ascribed aims.”30 In Daalder and Lindsay’s words, Bush believed that America
was “unbound,” unfettered by other countries or the so-called “international
community.” It was this ideological attitude, rather than any lessons derived from
the Balkans, that ultimately informed, if not misinformed, the policy prescrip-
tions for how the US should behave in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact,
when discussions turned to the “Bosnia precedent” or how experiences in the
Balkans could inform Iraq policy, high-ranking members of the Bush govern-
ment claimed that “Bosnia wasn’t the proper precedent to study.”31 Rather than
taking stock of achievements and shortcomings and using Bosnia and Kosovo as
examples of what to emulate and what to avoid, the administration’s ideological
credo triumphed, ultimately leading to worse, rather than better, responses
toward subsequent failed states.  
The Balkan Exception?
Interestingly, Bosnia and the Balkans have become the examples de jure of
successful American-led intervention and state reconstruction.  As The New York
Times recently acknowledged, however attractive the Bosnia analogy is these
days for helping American policy-makers sort out the mess it created in Iraq, it
is quite an inappropriate model.32 The article explains why international involve-
ment in Bosnia was so successful and lists three conditions that made the Balkans
so unique, other than the most obvious: the unusual role of the US in this region
and its status as a fairly neutral actor with little to gain from its involvement.
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However, there are at least three other qualities that make international involve-
ment in this Balkan country exceptional and difficult to recreate.
First, the size of a country matters for many obvious reasons, and although
Bosnia is large compared with Kosovo, it is still only a country of about 4.5 mil-
lion people.  Kosovo’s population is estimated at around 2 million. Iraq’s popu-
lation (27.5 million) and Afghanistan’s (31.9 million) stand in stark contrast to
these mere city states. Numbers are important for many reasons but most imme-
diately because the size of a targeted country’s population has a direct bearing on
the need for and the ability of occupying troops to gain superiority, if not a
monopoly on violence. That is to say, troop-to-task ratio has a direct bearing on
a foreign force’s ability to gain and retain a monopoly on violence. Without this
monopoly, so-called “state leaders” are only competitors for the reigns of power
and authority. Iraq is a good example of this, but as others have noted, President
Hamid Karzai’s power in Afghanistan barely goes beyond the gates of Kabul.33
A second fundamental difference between the Balkans and ongoing cases
of American-led peace-building is, as real estate professionals remind us, loca-
tion, location, and location. Nestled in Europe, albeit on its periphery, Bosnia is
about two hours by plane from stable Vienna or wealthy Rome and next to
democracy’s birthplace, Athens. This made it easier, as well as more logical, for
the international community (read European Union states) to want to sink money,
time, and thought into these war-torn states. Location directly affects national
interest. Not surprisingly, Europe, by way of the EU or individual country dona-
tions, has played a more significant role in providing economic assistance for
reconstruction and political direction.34 From 1999-2004, for example, the EU
alone provided more than one-third of all aid to Kosovo. 35
Regardless of where the money originates, the investment in rebuilding
these European statelets has been significant; compared with Afghanistan, for
instance, the amount spent on Bosnia and Kosovo has been, to put it diplomati-
cally, quite generous. While money continues to flood into Iraq from the US, the
needs of Afghanistan’s reconstruction have been ignored by the international
community but particularly by the US government. Former US Ambassador to
Afghanistan (2002-03), Robert P. Finn, laments US policy: “I said it from the
get-go that we didn’t have enough money and we didn’t have enough people . . .
I’m saying the same thing six years later.”36 At the Tokyo Donors Conference for
Afghanistan, for example, the international community pledged just $64 per per-
son, while aid to Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia received, on average,
about $250 per person and giving to some countries exceeded even this
amount.37
Finally, location affects more than just travel time and the desire to provide
funding. It also impacts the most important difference between the Balkans and
failed states in the Middle East: the role of identity, both national and religious,
and specifically how national groups see themselves vis-à-vis foreign occupying
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countries. As much as Westerners might want to distance themselves from the
horrors of the ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe, nationalism, and even the
violent kind, has been a defining feature of European history. Bosnians, Croats,
and Serbs have always seen themselves as Europeans and part of the Western
enlightenment tradition. Perhaps even more so than Poles and Hungarians, who
were in the firm grasp of the Soviet Union, the Balkan nations were not part of
the Soviet controlled Eastern bloc; thanks to Josip Tito, Yugoslavia was a found-
ing member and leader of the nonaligned movement starting in 1961. 
During the Cold War, Balkan nations had more contact with the West than
any of the other socialist countries. This European, rather than Balkan identity,
was apparent in the more liberal voices that emerged in the late 1980s but were
silenced by nationalist war-mongering.38 Some Afghan and Iraqi leaders have a
pro-American or Western orientation, but they do not reflect or represent a size-
able part of the population, who feels that it has been isolated from its history,
heritage, or culture. That is to say, there is no notion of a “return to Europe”
because Europe and the West are not part of the national identity. In fact, identi-
ties in the Middle East have been shaped in opposition to the West or complete-
ly separate from it.39
The Balkans and Selective Learning 
In many ways, stabilization and reconstruction in the Balkans were an easy
test case, and the international community should have had little problem putting
these countries back together. Yet, they did have many problems, and numerous
analyses were produced, both critical and complementary, in an effort to improve
future policies.40 It appears that the Bush administration gave little thought to the
particularities of the Balkans or learned from the achievements or pitfalls of
international involvement there, even as it embarked on what many argued
would be similar military engagements in Afghanistan or Iraq. Instead, doctrinal
unilateralism held sway, the administration maintained in its words or deeds that:
first, stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction were not only possible but
would be easy; second, military force was an effective tool of US foreign policy;
third, American unilateral actions were sufficient and support from allies was
nice but not necessary; and finally, American values were shared global values.
As this section demonstrates, these assertions were total falsehoods, and
America-led efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo soundly contradicted each of these
myths. 
The Mixed History of Nation-Building
There is a significant consensus on this one point: nation-building or exter-
nal attempts to promote stable democracies are rarely successful. “Historically,
nation building attempts by outside powers are notable mainly for their bitter dis-
2008
56
appointments, not their triumphs.”41 Although scholars calculate that only 16 out
of more than 200 (or roughly eight percent) of all American military interven-
tions from 1900-2003 have been actual attempts at nation-building, the success
rate is still mixed at best.42 In fact, of the cases Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper
examine, only two are considered unambiguous success stories: Japan (1945-52)
and West Germany (1945-49).43 The authors characterize the remaining 11 cases
as failures because, 10 years after the departure of American forces, the country
was not democratic.
Conrad C. Crane, director of the US Army Military History Institute at the
US Army War College, conducted similar research and arrived at nearly the same
conclusions. His unflinching evaluation of the military’s record demonstrates
that military academics have clearly and objectively acknowledged the failures
of the past as well as the fundamental difference, as he puts it, between “drain-
ing swamps and transplanting values.”44 Although the military can do the former,
it rarely has accomplished the latter. When the military has been successful, like
in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Germany, it was due to a combination of
good planning, luck, and patience. Even in these so-called successful cases,
Crane is clear to limit himself to analyzing the military’s role in stabilization,
noting that history shows a consistent pattern of military effectiveness in these
areas — when properly motivated and resourced. But stability or “draining
swamps” is quite different from transplanting values and bringing the hope of
democracy, development, and free trade. The bottom line is clear if unfortunate:
the US military can provide security with restraint and perseverance, but it can-
not instill values. 
This conventional wisdom notwithstanding, it did not appear to influence
the Bush administration’s thinking or behavior as it planned the invasions of
Afghanistan or Iraq. In fact, in both cases the administration tried as hard as it
could to downplay any problems, resisting efforts to create ambitious, long-term
projects in either Afghanistan or Iraq. The administration’s optimism shortly
after the US intervened in Iraq bordered on cheeky as Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld delivered his now infamous “dead ender” speech.45 As is now
well known, however, Rumsfeld could not have been more wrong. Perhaps his
confidence was the result of ignorance or active disinterest in potential compli-
cations. A 2005 Rand Corporation study concluded that, among the top leaders
of the administration, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction were
addressed only very generally, largely because the prevailing view was that the
task would not be difficult.46
In the Pentagon, as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance was being haphazardly set up by Jay Garner, few seemed alarmed by
the administration’s lack of preparation or planning because of the steadfast con-
viction that, when the war ended, the Iraqi civil servants would return to work
and the ministries would run themselves; “the assumption was that the best-case
scenario would prevail.”47 With this said, this particular Pentagon office did not
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enjoy either the support or input of military officers, many with years of post-
conflict and reconstruction experience. As a former member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff explained, under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and especially when it
came to Iraq, military advice was compromised by political leadership.48 Experts
working outside the Pentagon on these issues, such as Robert Perito (and James
Dobbins), were initially asked to comment on the rebuilding of Iraq because of
their knowledge and experiences in the Balkans and elsewhere. After comment-
ing that the administration needed to plan for the possibility of high levels of vio-
lence in the first two years, Perito was thanked but was never contacted by the
Pentagon again.49
At this point, it is worthwhile to add that American-led efforts in the
Balkans were neither easy nor wholly successful. It is true that not a single for-
eign soldier has been killed in combat in Bosnia and calm has been evident for
more than a decade, yet both reconstruction and genuine democracy have been,
at best, slow and tenuous. Unemployment remains at about 45 percent and about
a quarter of the country remains in poverty. Important achievements aside,
Bosnia remains highly fragile. It is even more of a stretch to refer to Kosovo as
a relative success story, given the words used to describe the difficult Kosovo
stalemate and the possible collapse of international negotiations on its future sta-
tus.50 The International Crisis Group (ICG) warns that inaction on the part of the
international community risks “a new bloody and destablising conflict.”51 Given
the country’s recent declaration of independence and the continuing activity of
radical elements, it is still unclear whether Kosovo will be regarded as a suc-
cessful case of reconstruction, a failure, or like Bosnia, something in between. 
Force is Only Part of the Solution
As the saying goes, if the only tool you have is a hammer, then every prob-
lem starts to look like a nail. Given US military supremacy, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that military force has been given such priority in addressing failed states
today. This opinion, however, has distorted three of the most important take-
home points of the Balkan experience. First, although the US military is techno-
logically the most advanced military it in the world, it was not technology that
made the NATO-led international force so effective in Bosnia; it was instead
“boots on the ground” or the large number of ground troops that allowed NATO-
led troops to accomplish the military mission in a matter of months. Rather than
admitting this, the administration, pushed by the Secretary of Defense, empha-
sized America’s technological edge and its ability to wage wars from the air.
Finally, we should not forget how large the international force was in Bosnia. In
the first year after the violence ended, there were some 60,000 foreign troops in
Bosnia, though in subsequent years the number dropped to about 20,000.52 In
Kosovo, some 50,000 troops flooded a region that was less than half the size of
Bosnia.  When compared with other American-led nation-building exercises,
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Bosnia and Kosovo had more troops per 1,000 inhabitants than were in Germany,
Japan, and certainly in Afghanistan. The following figure is taken from the Rand
Corporation’s research on American-led nation-building. It provides a visual
depiction of the force levels in a comparative context. Note that the only coun-
try with higher force levels at the beginning phase of the intervention was
Germany (though, by year three, Bosnia was on par with Germany, while high-
force levels per capital were already evident in Kosovo).
Source: James Dobbins, et al. America’s Role in Nation-Building: From
Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), p. 151.
IFOR (Implementation Force) and then SFOR (Stabilization Force)’s abil-
ity to overwhelm and deter the three separate armies in Bosnia as well as the
numerous militia groups was the first and most important step toward the re-
creation of the Bosnian state.  By stopping the violence and demilitarizing the
population within a matter of months, Bosnian leaders in Sarajevo could claim
to be, and were perceived as, the legitimate rulers of the country — and all else
could follow.  KFOR (Kosovo Force) was similarly successful at this early stage.
As is discussed in numerous places, the discussion of, and eventual deployment
of, troops in Afghanistan and Iraq has not been sufficient. In Iraq in particular,
the necessary troop levels were hotly debated and where the lessons of Bosnia
crept in, at least for the US Army chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, and the
retired US Army Major-General William Nash (among others in the military)
who testified that, based on the Bosnia experience, somewhere between 250,000
and 400,000 troops would be necessary for the first stage of intervention.53
Disregarding military minds and Balkan lessons, some 100,000 troops launched
the Iraqi invasion, with far fewer available for post-conflict stabilization and
construction.
Figure 1 — Higher Force Levels for Longer Time Periods Promote
Successful Nation-Building
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Even if one acknowledges the significant differences between the military
forces demanded in Bosnia and the large number of troops that were deployed,
this misses another crucial point; force was never the sole or even primary strat-
egy in the Balkans. Other forms of influence were exercised simultaneously by
the international community.  Military force, indeed, played a crucial role in
stopping and deterring violence, but the military solution was but a part of a more
comprehensive, multi-level approach to reconstruction in the Balkans, which
also entailed restructuring Bosnian institutions of governance and the promotion
of grassroots democracy and civil society. 
The civilian side of peace-building in Kosovo was, even more so, a multi-
pronged endeavor that included an array of governments and intergovernmental
organizations.  In addition to top-down and official ways of stabilizing and
reconstructing Kosovo, significant time and money went to bottom-up efforts to
foster democracy and civil society.54 Although heavily debated, the net effect of
these other strategies and the use of softer forms of power have been the empow-
erment of individuals, particularly those from traditionally marginalized groups
like women and minorities, as well as the development of scores of local organ-
izations committed to economic and social development, women’s rights, and
education. 
It is worth noting that early on in the reconstruction of Bosnia it was rec-
ognized that not nearly enough attention was given to the civilian side of these
operations, which were more complicated and ultimately less successful than the
military operations. This recognition shaped international involvement in
Kosovo, but this knowledge had little staying power, at least within in the US.55
In 1996, President Bill Clinton called for what later became the Presidential
Decision Directive 56 (signed in 1997) to improve the country’s responses to
complex contingency operations. It was designed to ensure that the lessons
learned would be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis.56
Although the Clinton administration did little to implement this directive, the
Bush administration ignored it completely, and there were few attempts to devel-
op civilian capacity in this area.57 On the eve of the Iraqi intervention, the civil-
ian side of post-conflict reconstruction was, unfortunately, quite deficient.58
Finally, blind faith in the efficacy of military force ignores the most fun-
damental reason why NATO-led troops were effective in the Balkans: they were
seen as neutral parties and not an occupying force. This is not to suggest that the
Serbs did not resent the presence of NATO-led troops — given Russia’s involve-
ment, it was tolerable — but merely thinking that boots on the ground are the
solution disregards the importance of perception and public opinion. By the time
the US military had some freedom of movement and tried to implement one of
the Balkan lessons learned, it was already too late and the presence of more
troops was counterproductive.59
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The Illusion of Unilateralism
One of the most criticized aspects of the Bush administration has been its
attitude toward other countries, particularly its European allies.60 Regardless of
whether the current administration actually discounts the opinions of countries,
the perception of many around the world is that the US does not take into con-
sideration the opinions of other countries, even its allies.61 And although the US
can easily go it alone when it comes to launching military strikes, it simply can-
not — and does not — work alone when it comes time to cleaning up the mess
and putting countries back together. This fact has been evidenced clearly in the
reconstruction of Bosnia and Kosovo, as has the important role of the United
Nations.
It may be fair to characterize the military effort in Bosnia and Kosovo as
US-led, but it is plain wrong to suggest that reconstruction and development in
either place have been dominated by the US.  In reality, peace-building in the
Balkans has been a multilateral and multi-leveled effort. United Nations man-
dates for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Kosovo have meant that these efforts
have drawn on the extensive resources, field capabilities, and wealth of expert-
ise of the UN offices, as well as numerous governments, regional organizations,
and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).62
The presence and importance of numerous players was apparent in the
international military forces that were assembled for both missions. IFOR in
Bosnia was a 36-nation coalition of NATO and non-NATO countries, while
KFOR consisted of 39 NATO and non-NATO countries.63 With every year, the
number of US troops, compared with troops from Europe, declined; in 2003,
some 12,000 foreign troops remained in Bosnia, while fewer than 2,000 were
from the US.64 In late 2004, the US marked the end of its nine-year peacekeep-
ing mission, turning over the command of foreign troops to the European Union
Force (EUFOR). As of early 2008, some 7,000 troops from 33 countries, mostly
from Europe, remain in Bosnia. As of the spring of 2007, there were 16,000
troops in Kosovo, with the US providing just 3,000.
Meanwhile, the need for long-term stability and reconstruction in Bosnia
has pushed the European Union to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. By
1998, it was not only coordinating international assistance for the country’s
reconstruction but also had developed the Balkan Stability Pact, demonstrating
the EU’s move into security affairs and its reliance on multiple organizations to
reconstruct the region. By 2004, both the EU and NATO were dangling mem-
bership before Bosnia to promote regional stability and development. If Bosnia
marked the EU’s debut in peace-building, its involvement in Kosovo made it a
central player. The March 2007 Ahtisaari Report highlights the leading role the
EU should play in Kosovo’s future.65 The ICG, similarly, emphasized that
despite Washington’s tough talk with the Serbs about Kosovo’s independence, it
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has not adopted the same tone with Moscow because it essentially expects
Europe to be the leader on this international problem.66
The Balkan experience is testament to the importance of multilateral coop-
eration, overlapping missions, and mutually reinforcing messages. Yet, as the
Bush administration planned invasions and reconstruction elsewhere, it ignored
these lessons.  In Afghanistan, it cajoled its allies to get involved but, shortly
after the war ended, disputes among the allies emerged because of US attention
to fighting terrorism rather than focusing on reconstruction and development —
to the dismay of its European friends.67 As is well-documented, the invasion of
Iraq was far more acrimonious and the US not only did not have the support of
the UN and most of its allies but the so-called “coalition of the willing,” the 49
willing countries that initially became involved in the American-led effort in
Iraq, totalled fewer than 24,000 troops (less than 10 percent of the total).68 Even
within the US government, cooperation and coordination among different agen-
cies just did not happen; instead, the Pentagon, alone and isolated, adopted and
implemented a strikingly unilateral plan that relied almost entirely on the
Department of Defense for the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq.69
American Values
In discussing the US foreign policy, especially as it relates to failed states,
the Bush administration has maintained, that “American values are universal.”70
In some cases, this may be true, but in others, it is abundantly clear that American
or Western values and institutions are neither feasible nor prudent for states
emerging from conflict or collapse. As Francis Fukuyama observes, the United
States is bad at nation-building not only because Americans have an anti-state
culture and are opposed to large bureaucracies but because its leaders do not
admit to the contradictions of their own policies.71 Americans fail to acknowl-
edge that state-building and democracy promotion, while two key foreign-policy
concerns for the US, tend to work at cross purposes, and it is almost impossible
to rebuild or strengthen a state while, at the same time, democracy is consolidat-
ed. In fact, the history of western political development suggests that the build-
ing of states and democracy taking hold are usually separated by hundreds of
years. Overcoming or mitigating such contradictions requires, above all, some
recognition of this fact. 
One of the biggest obstacles to democracy and self-sustaining peace in
Bosnia has been the institutional structure created by the Dayton Peace Accords.
Designed at a difficult historical moment, the peace treaty essentially created a
weak federal structure that divided the country while it kept it together. In prac-
tice, this left the country separated into two monoethnic units while numerous
top-down and bottom-up mechanisms were adopted to reunify the country. The
elections in September 1996 pushed by the US and heralded as a great success,
merely reinforced, if not strengthened, the position of nationalists. For years
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after, the country was at a stalemate as politicians continued their struggle in
other ways, albeit without violence. For more than a decade since, only interna-
tional will, the presence of foreign troops, and lots of financial assistance have
been able to mitigate these artificial institutional divisions and the federal state’s
weakness and maintain the country’s fragile existence.72
This problematic institutional solution was the result of many factors but
was influenced significantly by American attitudes and assumptions about world
politics. Bosnia, in fact, represents “the dominant approach to nation-building,”
which consists of: international support for a settlement between warring parties;
help in setting up a country’s governing structures; and economic assistance to
restructure the state, financial institutions, and civil society.73 However, under-
pinning each of these strategies is what Roland Paris refers to as “a liberal inter-
nationalist world view” or the assumption that future states will look like secu-
lar, democratic states in the West.74 Such assumptions remain as the United
States and the international community responds to other failed states and con-
tinues to engage in peace-building. In practice, this means that failed states —
regardless of their history, realities on the ground, and the resources available —
must not only be rebuilt, but they must be democratic, multiethnic, and secular.
CONCLUSION: EVEN MORE LESSONS FROM THE BALKANS 
International involvement in the Balkans, as useful and important as it has
been to saving lives and restoring peace in this region, has not led American lead-
ers to learn from these experiences or to improve their strategies toward other
failed states. This is not because no one understood or analyzed the achievements
and shortcomings of these efforts; on the contrary, many individuals learned and
potentially useful institutions and mechanisms were created to document the les-
sons learned and to improve post-conflict reconstruction. However, as I demon-
strated, the ideological beliefs of the President and his senior advisors were more
important, ultimately distorting the ‘take-home’ points of the Balkan experience
and subsequent policies toward other failed states. To summarize, the Balkans
demonstrated that stabilization and reconstruction were difficult, time-consum-
ing tasks; coercive military force alone was not sufficient for peace-building;
multilateralism was crucial to the success of these missions; and finally,
American or Western liberal values and institutions are sometimes self-defeating,
especially when they are forced on a country. Unfortunately, these lessons did not
conform to the president’s view of the world or how the US should execute its
foreign policies. 
The current environment in the Balkans, moreover, provides additional
insight that should be considered by the US and other members of the interna-
tional community as the world continues to engage and assist failed states else-
where. First, there is a fundamental difference between state-building and nation-
building and decision-makers should try to identify (and remember) which goals
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they seek: reconciling and unifying a nation or strengthening and rebuilding a
state?  The international community can and has helped strengthen and rebuild
states, but this is quite different from nation-building or fostering a community
of people who feel like they belong together. As others have noted, nation-build-
ing is not just a physical, technical process but is also a psychological one and a
process which external actors have little influence.75 Bosnia and Kosovo are no
exception, and while both states now exist on the map, they do so only because
of the support from the international community. The economic, military, and
psychological support from the international community has, indeed, strength-
ened these political units, but it has done quite little to foment a Bosnian or
Kosovar nation.
Second, the Balkans today remind us that although states matter a great
deal so too do neighborhoods and the network of institutions and organizations
that transcends borders. More porous borders in Europe have allowed suprana-
tional bodies, regional organizations, and NGOs to supplement and support
states and international efforts in the Balkans. Thus, the neighborhood effect has
been largely a positive factor in these countries’ development. Even the Serbs are
showing signs that they are vulnerable to the lure of the EU and the carrots of
Western governments and other regional organizations. In Afghanistan and Iraq,
the neighborhood may, however, prove to be as challenging as the threats ema-
nating from within these states. 
Third, the evolving reconstruction of Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate
clearly Europe’s more assertive role in the world, but they also hint at the signif-
icant changes in global governance that are underway. These changes are evi-
denced by the way governments behave toward each other, intergovernmental
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations . For more than a decade, the
Balkans have been host to hundreds of regional organizations and international
NGOs that have been involved in almost every aspect of reconstruction and
development. In this region, non-state actors have, for the most part, helped
strengthen states and furthered the international mission. Elsewhere, we cannot
assume that these agents will play the same role. In Afghanistan, for example,
President Karzai has been openly critical of international NGOs, claiming that
these actors are taking away money from the Afghan state by creating unneces-
sary parallel structures. Thus, peace-building efforts in the Balkans provide a
window into what may be a transnational network of public and private actors
that relies on similar strategies and assumptions to promote peace and stability.76
At the same time, there is no reason why transnational networks are inherently
good, and public and private actors could emerge elsewhere that are bent on
fomenting violence and instability. 
The final take-home lesson of the Balkans is the need for more pragmatism
when it comes to responding to failed states and reconstructing them. We should
not forget that politics and ideology will always intervene between historical
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experiences and policies. In some cases, ideology will triumph and some, if not
all, of the lessons that should have been learned from historical achievements or
failures, will be lost.  
Almost twelve years in the Balkans, six in Afghanistan, and four in Iraq
should have resulted in some genuine foreign policy learning and yielded better
policies; unfortunately, for the US, this has not been the case. 
Patrice C. McMahon is an Associate Professor at the University of Nebraska,
Lincoln.
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